All analyses in chronological order - Afro-Middle East Centre

By Giorgio Cafiero

On 7 November, Haaretz reported that Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa Haftar, flew on a private French-made Dassault Falcon jet out of the United Arab Emirates and landed in Israel for a 90-minute visit before flying to Libya. The purpose was for Haftar and his son to pursue ‘military and diplomatic assistance from Israel’, according to the report.

With Libya’s elections scheduled for 24 December, this brief landing at Ben-Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv was part of Haftar’s electoral campaign. The eastern commander, who led the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) during Libya’s civil war, wants to differentiate himself from other Libyans seeking to become the country’s head of state.

‘It’s a way of distinguishing Haftar from the rest of the candidates and promising something that is supposed to have value in the eyes of the United States, but also in the eyes of other countries that embrace whatever the UAE – the main sponsor of Haftar – has been doing through its activism in the region, which means Egypt, France, Morocco, and you can go down the list,’ said Jalel Harchaoui, a researcher at Global Initiative, in an interview with The New Arab. ‘It’s a way of Haftar saying “If you support me becoming president, here’s one tangible thing that I can deliver for you and no one else can.”’

The relationship between Haftar and the Israelis is not a new partnership; it dates back to 1987. ‘Contacts between Libyans and Israelis have been underway for some time – probably through the Mossad and other organisations – and it is not surprising that they have intensified lately, given the proximity of the elections in Libya,’ explained Dr Federica Saini Fasanotti, a non-resident fellow at the Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution.

What made Saddam Haftar’s brief visit to Tel Aviv significant was not the substance of the relationship between his father and Israel, but rather the decision to make it known to the whole world rather than concealing it.

Libya’s fractures and divisions

Politically speaking, eastern and western Libya have major differences that are relevant to any discussion of the North African country entering the Abraham Accords, the agreement brokered by the former US president, Donald Trump, between Israel and a number of Arab states. In Libya’s east, political Islam does not exist; n western Libya, political Islam might not necessarily be extremely popular, but it exists. Whereas eastern Libya is somewhat reflective of the UAE and Egypt’s political systems, the west has much more in common with Tunisia and Algeria, where the Palestinian cause is considered ‘sacred’, as Algeria’s President Abdelmadjid Tebboune put it. Also, the Turkish influence in western Libya matters too, particularly considering Ankara’s efforts to position itself as a defender of the Palestinian struggle.

Within this context, Haftar being the head of state and deciding to bring the country into the Abraham Accords risks reigniting major tensions in Libya. ‘If you broach a topic like normalisation with Israel, you’re going to intensify what differentiates the eastern part of Libya from the western part,’ according to Harchaoui. The implications could be toxic from the standpoint of bringing Libyans together in a post-conflict era. ‘The western part of Libya is the most populous part, containing more than two-thirds of the population,’ said the Europe-based Libya expert. ‘When you look at that part of the population and you say, “I hereby declare normalisation with Israel”, you go [against] all the [UN-led] efforts…to try to avoid a partition of the nation, try to promote unification, reconciliation, and integration.’

US foreign policy implications

Like his predecessor, President Joe Biden and those in his administration believe that adding more Arab countries to the Abraham Accords must be a US foreign policy objective. A bipartisan consensus behind this stance exists among American lawmakers. Hence it is fair to conclude that Haftar promising to bring Libya into the Abraham Accords could help him a fair amount in Washington despite condemnations which the eastern commander has received from certain American officials over the years as well as lawsuits filed against him in US courts.

‘There are many decision-makers [in the USA] who don’t really care about the reality of Libya,’ according to Harchaoui. ‘They say, “If we could have a high-profile leader that embraces Israel, I don’t really care about the details of what happens on the ground. It’s still one step forward.” It’s basically the same reasoning that led Trump to recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Like you disregard the consequences of the actual stability on the ground, and you say, “It’s a very nice victory from the point of view of acceptance of Israel, and I don’t care what happens on the ground.” You have a whole faction in Washington, DC that thinks in those terms.’

Indeed, among US officials there has been a total lack of concern for how the Abraham Accords have played out on the ground in the Arab region. In a Machiavellian manner, many policymakers in Washington believe in encouraging more Arab countries to normalise with Israel, regardless of the consequences. The fact that the transactional nature of Morocco entering the Abraham Accords in exchange for US recognition of Rabat’s sovereignty over Western Sahara has revived decades-old tensions between Morocco and Algeria doesn’t matter much to Washington. The same can be said about the tensions which the Abraham Accords have heightened in Bahrain between the government and opposition groups, as well as how the Trump administration’s extortion of Sudan severely harmed the country’s fragile democratic transition.

Israel becoming more and more accepted in the Middle East and North Africa’s diplomatic fold is what matters to officials in Washington and Abu Dhabi. ‘You have this complacency that leads the Biden administration to support the UAE worldview,’ explained Harchaoui. ‘The UAE worldview, acceptance of Israel – all of these philosophies require you to ignore what goes on in the real world.’

Israeli stakes in Libya

Libya-Israel ties would not only serve the interests of Haftar. Benefits could go both ways. Israel has many interests in Libya, from the North African country’s ‘highly strategic geographical position to unlimited energy’, explained Dr Fasanotti. ‘In this chess game, we must not forget the consistent presence of Turkey in Tripolitania which, given the tense relations with Israel and other countries over the issue of offshore gas in the eastern Mediterranean, certainly plays a primary strategic role.’

In eastern Libya, which is the part of the country closest to Palestine, there is a security architecture and political order that suits Israeli interests. The absence of any Islamist political opposition or pro-Palestinian/pro-Hamas groups in Libya’s east is satisfactory to Tel Aviv. It’s safe to bet that the Israelis would take steps to help this Egypt-like order survive over the years by strongly supporting Haftar if he becomes the next Libyan head of state. When asked if Haftar is the ‘Israeli horse in the [Libyan election] race’, Michael Oren, the former Israeli ambassador to the US, replied, ‘Yes, he’s in the race and it’s a track that has been well run.’

By having his son land on Israeli soil, shake hands, and signal a determination to normalise with Israel, Haftar is giving Israel a vested interest in his becoming Libya’s leader. As Marco Carnelos, a former Italian diplomat, noted, considering Haftar’s health issues he may be looking to establish a family dynasty in Libya that could put his son at the helm down the line. Therefore, having Saddam Haftar land in Israel could be about making a powerful statement about how much Haftar would like to invest in a partnership with Israel for the long haul if he is to win the 24 December elections.

At stake for Tel Aviv are also ‘the prestige and this impression of momentum with more Arab centres of power that one by one decide to embrace Israel,’ explained Harchaoui. ‘If Israel could actually maintain that narrative of a persistent momentum in that direction of more acceptability, it’s a form of a win.’

Impact on the Arab region’s geopolitical order

Libya entering the Abraham Accords would further signal success on the part of Emirati activism in Africa following Sudan and Morocco’s normalisation with Israel last year in deals that the UAE helped push through, plus Tunisia’s 25 July 2021 autogolpe which constituted another win for Abu Dhabi. A Haftar-led Libya formalising relations with Tel Aviv would serve the interests of the UAE, USA and, obviously, Israel too. But not all states in the Maghreb would see Libya’s entry into the Abraham Accords as good news.

From the perspective of Algiers, the expansion of Emirati influence in North Africa and the trend to normalise with Israel both threaten Algeria’s national interests. A concern among officialdom in Algiers is that Emirati activism in North Africa, specifically Abu Dhabi’s efforts to bring countries in the Maghreb and Sahel into the Abraham Accords, is leaving Algeria in a weaker and more vulnerable position. For example, after Rabat normalised with Israel in exchange for Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, the Algerian Prime Minister said that there was a ‘real threat on our borders, reached by the Zionist entity’.

‘Algeria would see any normalisation of ties with Israel by Haftar as evidence of the general’s designs on its stability and a grave escalation on his part,’ Sami Hamdi, the Managing Director of the International Interest, a global risk and intelligence company, told The New Arab. Indeed, there would be a concern that with both Morocco and Libya locked into diplomatic agreements with Israel, such relations with Tel Aviv could be weaponised against Algeria down the line.

* Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics. 

** This article was first published by The New Arab

By Ramzy Baroud

When the news circulated that Morocco’s leading political group, the Development and Justice Party (PJD), had been trounced in the latest election, held in September, official media mouthpieces in Egypt celebrated the news as if the PJD’s defeat was, in itself, a blow to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Regionally, political commentators who dedicated much of their time to discredit various Islamic political parties – often on behalf of one Arab government or another – found in the news another supposed proof that political Islam was a failure in both theory and practice.


 

‘Regionally, the news of the (PJD) failure was greeted with jubilation,’ Magdi Abdelhadi wrote on the BBC English website. ‘Commentators regarded the fall of PJD as the final nail in the coffin of political Islam,’ he added. 

Missing from such sweeping declarations is that those who greeted the defeat of the PJD with ‘jubilation’ are mostly the very crowd that dismissed political Islam even during its unprecedented surge following the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011; and the same intellectual mercenaries who unashamedly continue to sing the praises of such dictators as General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt and the various Arab monarchs in the Gulf. 

The PJD was not only defeated but almost completely demolished as a result of the vote, managing to retain only twelve of the 125 seats it had won in the 2016 election. The reasons behind such failure, however, are being misconstrued by various entities, governments and individuals with the aim of settling old scores and tarnishing political rivals. The ultimate objective here seems to be to cement the status quo where the fate of Arab nations remains in the grip of brutal, corrupt and self-aggrandising rulers who do not tolerate genuine political plurality and democracy.

For those who insist on viewing Arab and Middle Eastern politics through generalised, academic notions, the outcome of the Moroccan election has provided a perfect opportunity to delve further into sweeping statements. These knee-jerk, cliched reactions were boosted by the ongoing political crisis in Tunisia, the main victim of which, aside from Tunisian democracy, is the Ennahda Islamist party.

Democracy crisis in Tunisia

On 25 July, Tunisian President Kais Saied began a series of measures that effectively dismantled the country’s entire democratic infrastructure, while concentrating all power in his hands.

Taking advantage of the poor performances and endemic dysfunction of the country’s major political parties, including Ennahda, as well as the festering economic crisis and the growing dissatisfaction among ordinary Tunisians, Saied justified his actions as a way ‘to save the state and society’.

An academic with no real political experience, Saied provided no roadmap to restore the country’s democracy or to fix its many socio-economic ailments. Instead, on 29 September, he appointed another inexperienced politician, also an academic, Najla Bouden Romdhane, to form a government. Saied’s choice of selecting a woman for the post – making her the first Arab woman prime minister – was probably designed to communicate a message of progressive politics, and to win himself more time. But to what end? 

In reviewing Saied’s political programme since July, The Economist argued that the Tunisian president had ‘announced little in the way of an economic program, apart from inchoate plans to fight corruption and use the proceeds to fund development’. Saied’s strategy for lowering inflation is ‘to ask businesses to offer discounts’, according to the London-based publication, hardly the radical reordering of a country’s devastated economy. 

Frustrated by the failure to translate Tunisia’s budding democracy into a tangible difference that can be experienced in the everyday life of ordinary, unemployed and impoverished people, Tunisia’s public opinion has shifted gradually over the years. This small nation, which in 2011 had sought salvation through democracy, now links democracy with economic prosperity. According to a public opinion poll conducted by Arab Barometer in July 2021, three-quarters of Tunisians define democracy in terms of economic outcomes. Since the desired outcomes were not delivered under a succession of governments that ruled the country over the past decade, 87 per cent of Tunisians supported their president’s decision to sack the parliament. They may have hoped that Saied’s measures would reverse the devastating economic crisis. However, as it is becoming clear that Saied has no clear plan to steer Tunisia away from the tragic path of Lebanon and other failed economies, protesters are taking to the streets again, demanding a restoration of democracy and a return to plurality.

Deterministic vs Dynamic politics 

When the uprisings began in Tunisia late 2010 and spread across the region, it seemed that the fall of dictators and the rise of democracy was inevitable; also certain seemed the rise of Islamic parties, which had registered substantial victories in various democratic elections throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) – which was founded by the country’s Muslim Brotherhood – won 37 per cent of the votes in the parliamentary election in 2011; Morocco’s PJD secured over 25 per cent of available seats in the parliament; and Ennahda obtained 89 of 217 seats.

At the time, it was common to discuss Islamic parties as if they were all branches of the same ideological movement. In fact, in the view of some, even the same political movement. ‘Political Islam’ became synonymous with the ‘Arab Spring’. Some saw this as an opportunity for ‘moderate’ Muslims – marginalised, exiled and often tortured and killed – finally to claim what was rightfully theirs; others, namely Israeli and right-wing western intellectuals and politicians, decried what they saw as an ‘Islamic Winter’, claiming that democracy and Islam would espouse an even greater anti-western and anti-Israeli sentiment. 

Often missing from most of these discussions was the national context under which all Arab politics, whether Islamic-leaning or otherwise, operate. In Morocco, for example, King Mohammed VI played his own political game to ensure the survival of the monarchy in the age of democratisation. He quickly drew the Islamists nearer to him, offered a veneer of democracy, while practically holding on to all aspects of power.

Though it will take time to reach a conclusive analysis, it is possible that the PJD’s downfall was a result of its willingness to compromise on its declared principles in exchange for a very limited share of power. Indeed, it sometimes seemed as if the Islamic party, elected to steer the country away from the rule of a single individual, was serving the role of the King’s official political party. This was manifested in the PJD’s acceptance and eventual endorsement of Morocco’s normalisation of ties with the State of Israel in December 2020. 

The Islamists’ recent defeat in Morocco, however, must not be viewed as a crisis in political Islam, for the latter is a theoretical concept that is in constant flux and is open to various, often radically opposing, interpretations by different scholars and under different historical contexts. While the PJD, for example, signed off on the King’s normalisation with Israel, Ennahda vehemently rejected it. Indeed, each Islamic party seems to behave according to different sets of priorities that are unique to that party, to its socio-economic setting, national context, political objectives and, ultimately, to its own unique interests. 

Causes for optimism 

Instead of resorting to abstract notions and generalisations, such as ‘the fall of PJD (being) the final nail in the coffin of political Islam’, an alternative, and more sensible reading is possible. First, most Arab voters, like voters everywhere, judge politicians based on performance, not hype, slogans and chants. This is as true for Islamic parties as it is for socialists, secularists and all others; and it is as applicable to the Middle East as it to the rest of the world. 

Second, Morocco is a unique political space that must be analysed separately from Tunisia, and the latter from Egypt, or Palestine, and so on. While it is academically sound to speak of political phenomena, generalisations cannot be easily applied to everyday political outcomes. 

Third, the fact that the PJD is quietly retreating to the ranks of the opposition and that Ennahda is experiencing a substantial overhaul, is an indication that Islamic parties have, not only in theory but also in practice, accepted some of the main pillars of democracy and constructive plurality: democratic alternation, self-introspection and soul-searching.

Those who have comforted themselves with the misapprehension that political Islam is dead are reminiscent, in their self-deception, of Francis Fukuyama’s theory on the ‘end of history’ after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the temporarily-uncontested rise of the US as the world’s only superpower. Such provisional thinking is not only irrational, but is itself an outcome of ideologically-motivated wishful thinking. In the end, history remained in motion, as it always will.

While the Justice and Development Party, Ennahda and other Islamic parties have much reflection to do, it must be remembered that the future is not shaped by deterministic notions, but by dynamic processes that constantly produce new variables and, thus, new results. This is as true in North Africa as it has been proven to be in the rest of the world. 

* Dr Ramzy Baroud is a Non-resident Senior Research Fellow at the Afro-Middle East Centre. He is also the editor of The Palestine Chronicle, and the author of five books, the latest being These Chains Will Be Broken: Palestinian Stories of Struggle and Defiance in Israeli Prisons.

Since its founding in 2002, as the successor to the Organisation of African Unity, the African Union (AU) has prided itself on maintaining a united stance as a continental organisation, of being able to make decisions on the basis of consensus, and on keeping the Union together even when individual member states might be disputing or warring with each other. That sense of unity has been jeopardised over the past three months as the issue of the accreditation of Israel to the AU threatens to split the body down the middle.

By Pesha Magid

Civilians are regularly killed by the USA in its numerous wars across the world. The families of these victims rarely receive compensation for their loss. In cases where some payment is made, these 'condolence payments' are small, are given without an acknowledgement of responsibility, and are mostly an effort to win civilian support for the US war.

By Khadija Mohsen-Finan

Algeria's decision in August to break off diplomatic relations with Morocco was the latest episode in a long crisis of confidence between the two countries, dating back to the 1960s, but having deepened with the conflict over Western Sahara.

by Larbi Sadiki

Much of the reporting and commentary on Afghanistan over the past few weeks has been awash in Orientalism. Many of us are guilty of this practice in the process of opinion- and knowledge-making. It is, therefore, legitimate to ask whether when writing, commenting, reporting or analysing Afghanistan, those doing so are depicting aspects of its history, culture and people, or whether they are just producing reductive representations and stereotypes.

By Ramzy Baroud

Suddenly, the idea put forth by the French president, Emmanuel Macron, late last year no longer seems so far-fetched or untenable after all. Following the hurried and chaotic US-NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, European countries now find themselves forced to consider the once-unthinkable: a gradual disengagement from US dominance.

Romana Rubeo and Ramzy Baroud

On 4 February 2021, representatives from the Palestinian movement Hamas visited Moscow to inform the Russian government of the latest developments in unity talks between the Islamic resistance movement and its Palestinian counterparts, especially Fatah.

This was not the first time that Hamas’s officials had travelled to Moscow on similar missions. In fact, Moscow continues to represent an important political breathing space for Hamas, which has been isolated by Israel’s western benefactors. Involved in imposing this isolation are also several Arab governments that, undoubtedly, have done little to break the Israeli siege on Gaza.

The Russia-Hamas closeness is already paying dividends. On 17 February, shipments of the Russian COVID-19 vaccine, Sputnik V, made their way into Gaza via Israel, a testament to that growing rapport, and how it is being leveraged for the Palestinian benefit. While Russia alone cannot effect a complete paradigm shift in the case of Palestine, Hamas feels that a Russian alternative to the blind and conditional American support for Israel is possible, if not urgent. 

Recently, we interviewed Dr Daud Abdullah, author of Engaging the World: The Making of Hamas’s Foreign Policy, and Na’eem Jeenah, executive director of the Afro-Middle East Centre in Johannesburg, which published Abdullah’s book.

By Ramzy Baroud

Israeli anxiety was palpable after Israel’s prime minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, waited for days to be contacted by the new US president, Joe Biden, after the latter’s inauguration. While much is being read into Biden’s decision, including Washington’s lack of enthusiasm to return to the ‘peace process’, Moscow is generating attention as a possible alternative to the USA by hosting inter-Palestinian dialogue and discussing the future with leaders of Palestinian political groups. 

The Denis Hurley Peace Institute, an NGO that is part of the South African Cathholic Bishops' Conference, regularly compiles reports on Northern Mozambique from its sources in Pemba, Mozambique. We co-publish, with the DHPI, those reports here.

By Johan Viljoen

SA Government Puzzled by Failure of Mozambique Government to Request Regional Support

South Africa has expressed continuing frustration at the Mozambique government’s failure to state what help it wants in fighting a growing incursion which has now displaced more than 565,000 people. 

South African International Relations and Cooperation Minister Naledi Pandor said the inability of the regional body, the South African Development Community (SADC), to decide how to help Mozambique combat the  insurgency “remains a very worrying puzzle to us as the South African government”. 

“We have made every effort to reach out to the government of Mozambique and to sit with them to decide a support agenda,” she said on Wednesday in a webinar organised by London’s Chatham House on South Africa’s foreign policy. 

By Ali Fathollah-Nejad

On 4 January, a day after the one-year anniversary of the US assassination of top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad, Iran took two steps as a show of force, against the fallouts from the US ‘maximum pressure’ policy of then-outgoing US president, Donald Trump. First, Iran resumed uranium enrichment to 20 per cent, hugely exceeding the 3.67 per cent level allowed by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran nuclear deal), and notifying the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose inspectors are monitoring Iran’s nuclear programme, of its decision. Second, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seized a South Korean-flagged oil tanker in the Persian Gulf. Both actions, on the same day, were shows of force, with different rationales and intentions, but both part of an Iran counter-pressure strategy in the face of immense US-led pressure.

Iran's decision to enrich uranium to a level of 20 per cent (thus dramatically reducing the break-out time for developing a nuclear bomb, since 20 per cent enrichment constitutes nine-tenths of the enrichment work required to reach weapons-grade enrichment of about 90 per cent) represents the partial implementation of a law passed by the conservative-controlled parliament and quickly ratified by the hardline-dominated Guardian Council. The law demanded that the government of President Hassan Rouhani substantially boosts various components of the nuclear programme in order to force the USA to concede, in future negotiations, on the onerous sanctions it has imposed on Iran. On the same day, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweeted how Iran officially views this step: reducing its nuclear commitment as a legal response to the USA violating its JCPOA commitments, and its assurance that boosting its nuclear capacity was reversible once Washington recommits to its JCPOA obligations, and lifts re-imposed sanctions.

tweet

‘Our remedial action conforms fully with Para 36 of [the] JCPOA, after years of non-compliance by several other JCPOA participants,’ Zarif tweeted. ‘Our measures are fully reversible upon FULL compliance by ALL.’ 

Rouhani’s administration had, at least publicly, opposed the bill about boosting the nuclear programme, arguing that it would undermine prospects for renewed diplomacy after Joe Biden became US president on 20 January. It therefore passed a by-law to delay the implementation of the legislation. In fact, there are two layers – one primary, the other secondary – underlying Tehran’s decision to boost enrichment to 20 per cent.

First, despite factional infighting in Iran’s politics, it is important to note that Iran’s ‘maximum resistance’ strategy in response to the US ‘maximum pressure’ campaign is a product of cross-factional elite deliberations, and largely continues to be so. This strategy is centred on the core idea of resisting US pressure with counter-pressure (also referred to as ‘counter-containment’) by fortifying Iran’s deterrence strategy. This is to be achieved through a gradual (and reversible) reduction of Iran’s JCPOA commitments, and by its resistance to US policies in regional conflicts (such as in Iraq, Syria and Yemen), with concomitant shows of force and/or nuisances (such as the seizure of oil tankers since the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and displays of Iran’s ballistic missile and drone capabilities), thus signalling Tehran’s readiness for war. This calculation is also based on the assessment that Washington lacks the appetite for another large-scale Middle East war, while Iran regards war with the SA as too risky and possibly jeopardising stability amid massive domestic public dissatisfaction with the regime.

Iran’s accumulated deterrence power can then be translated, the argument goes, into bargaining leverage in eventual talks with the USA. Despite some official rhetoric to the contrary, there is no alternative for Tehran to such talks as Iran’s vital interests lie in stability-threatening sanctions being eased. Iran may, in fact, be willing in future to offer more concessions that could be proportional to the amount of US pressure. But Iranians expect that pressure to ease as Biden’s administration drops the ‘maximum pressure’ doctrine. The objective of Tehran’s current stance is to achieve a return to the position Iran had held before the 2013-2015 JCPOA negotiations when its advanced nuclear programme had offered the international community the bad choice between a rock (an Iranian nuclear bomb) and a hard place (bombing Iran). That scenario had helped – along with the Obama administration dropping its ‘zero enrichment’ demand – extract concessions from the West. Above all, it realised important sanctions relief. This was precisely the Iranian strategy preceding the JCPOA negotiations.

The secondary, yet considerably less crucial, layer underlying Tehran’s decision to boost enrichment to 20 per cent is domestic politics. The Rouhani administration (headed by a ‘lame duck’ president whose two-term limit ends in August) is pitted against more hardline rivals (whose camp is in charge of the nuclear programme and currently dominates the national security discourse) who seek to torpedo the government’s ability meaningfully to enter into talks with the USA ahead of Iran’s June presidential election. Barring a Rouhani diplomatic success with Biden, with consequent economic benefits for Iran, the June election is expected to be won by a conservative or hardline candidate. Many among the hardline establishment want to reap those economic benefits themselves after the election. 

However, the problem with this counter-containment/counter-pressure strategy is that alarmism alienates western powers, whose domestic anti-Iran forces will be emboldened to put pressure on western capitals not to appease or engage in rapprochement with an Islamic Republic that is seen as increasingly belligerent and confrontational. This can be seen in European reactions to Iran’s 20 per cent enrichment; European governments condemned the move as a ‘considerable departure’ from Iran’s JCPOA obligations, saying this threatened the deal’s survival.

The other 4 January show of force, the seizure of the South Korean tanker, has less to do with the official explanation that its confiscation was due to the vessel polluting Persian Gulf waters with chemicals, but is, rather, related to the freezing of an estimated $7 billion worth of Iranian assets in South Korean banks since 2019. The funds are for crude oil imports from Iran. Due to US extra-territorial sanctions prohibiting bank transfers – especially in US dollars – to Iran in particular, and US pressure in general, South Korea blocked these funds. The tanker incident happened just ahead of a scheduled 10 January visit to Tehran by a South Korean delegation. That delegation then included First Vice Foreign Minister Choi, who joined in order to hold talks about the release of the tanker. South Korea, one of Iran’s top oil importers, had dramatically reduced and even halted its oil imports as a result of the pressure of US sanctions, since Washington is an indispensable ally of Seoul. Iran’s move was intended to put pressure on South Korea to release the Iranian assets amid recent talks involving the three sides over the fate of the funds. It is doubtful that the seizure will lead to Seoul releasing the Iranian funds, since Washington’s stance will ultimately be decisive. One possibility would be, as contemplated by Tehran and Seoul, that part of the frozen Iranian funds will be used to pay for Iranian imports of COVID-19 vaccines and equipment from South Korea. South Korea subsequently asked Qatar, which has relatively close relations with Iran, for ‘maximum support’ to help release its tanker, which Doha agreed to do. However, Iran’s attempts have been futile thus far. In any case, this Iranian tanker seizure has important side-effects: it undermines the image of Iran as a reliable and stability-seeking Persian Gulf power in the eyes of East Asian powers that have become increasingly important purchasers of Iranian oil over the past decade.

Dr Ali Fathollah-Nejad is a Non-resident Senior Research Fellow at the Afro-Middle East Centre, and a former Iran expert of the Brookings Institution in Doha (BDC) and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) 

The Denis Hurley Peace Institute, an NGO that is part of the South African Cathholic Bishops' Conference, regularly compiles reports on Northern Mozambique from its sources in Pemba, Mozambique. We co-publish, with the DHPI, those reports here.

By Johan Viljoen

Concern Over TOTAL’s Increasing Leverage In Security Matters

After January 1, when 2 alleged insurgents were discovered in a residence in Afungi, Total has quietly resumed its work. At least the logistics are operating. Loads of supplies to the site were seen in Pemba. The report of insurgents killed by the Joint Task Force (FDS and Total), was enough for Total to announce the evacuation of Afungi during the first week of January. The document announcing the evacuation was based on two facts: 2 insurgents were killed at Quitupo, near the installations (although there are no reports of an engagement with insurgents), and a threat of attack on Palma for the 5th of January, which never materialized. Total had a structural project for the Mozambican economy interrupted because of a threat. This raises the question:  what is the capacity of the Joint Task Force? Sources in the sector say that Total used the pretext of insecurity to gain an advantage over the Joint Task Force itself. Total has claimed behind the scenes that the FDS soldiers who are part of the JTF are not properly prepared and some of them are suspected of being linked to the insurgency (there is no trust between the two parties) and some of them defected to the insurgency shortly after the events (allegedly because they are better paid there). Throughout the week of 11 January, the Government and Total held talks, in which Total challenged the government on three issues: the failure to provide the security guarantees promised in October, the lack of political solutions and the failure of military interventions. Under the July 2020 security agreement between Total and the Mozambican government, Afungi was to be protected by 1000 military and police officers and part of the private security contracted by Total, and there would be an increase in maritime security.  In exchange, Total agreed to provide funding and logistical support for the Joint Task Force. 

The Denis Hurley Peace Institute, an NGO that is part of the South African Cathholic Bishops' Conference, regularly compiles reports on Northern Mozambique from its sources in Pemba, Mozambique. We co-publish, with the DHPI, those reports here.

Johan Viljoen

Mozambique Government Concerned About Attacks Near TOTAL Installations

Pressured by oil company Total, which requires clear security guarantees in Afungi, the government of Filipe Nyusi is in a race against time to find a solution that will enable the continuity of gas projects in the Rovuma basin. In their most recent forays into the Palma District, insurgents were fought in the vicinity of Afungi, the center of oil operations. Alarms went off and Total E&P Mozambique Area 1, operator of the Mozambique LNG project, evacuated part of its camp, one of the measures in the security protocol. Some companies that provide services followed his example and removed their staff, paralyzing part of the activities. Last week, those in charge of Total's security sector travelled to Maputo to discuss security issues in Afungi with Mozambican authorities. It is not known whether or not there was a commitment or guarantee by the Government to strengthen security on the Afungi peninsula, the main requirement of the French company Total. On Monday, the President of the Republic travelled to Tanzania where he discussed with his counterpart John Magufuli ways to contain violent extremism in both countries. Foreign insurgents (Tanzanians, Somalis, Congolese, Rwandans, Ugandans and Burundians) operating in Cabo Delgado enter Mozambique across the common border with Tanzania, so a political agreement between the two states is essential to halt expansion and intensification of the armed violence in the north of the country. On his trip to Tanzania, Nyusi was accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief of the Police, Bernardino Rafael, and by the Commander of the Northern Operational Command Post, Major-General Eugénio Mussa. It is the first trip abroad dedicated to security issues in which the President of the Republic included a high ranking FADM officer in his entourage, a gesture that signals the power that the military is gaining in command of operations in Cabo Delgado.

The Denis Hurley Peace Initiative, an NGO that is part of the South African Cathholic Bishops' Conference, regularly compiles reports on Northern Mozambique from its sources in Pemba, Mozambique. We co-publish, with the DHPI, those reports here.

By Johan Viljoen

Refugees from Cabo Delgado Increasing in Nampula, Threatening Humanitarian Catastrophe

With a population of 743 125 (according to the 2017 census), Nampula is the third largest city in Mozambique (after Maputo and Beira). The city is in the grips of an extreme drought. There has been no rainfall since the beginning of last year, and the dam supplying water to the city has dried up. The city has been completely without water for two weeks now.

The situation is desperate. Covid19 infections are increasing exponentially, as residents are unable to wash their hands regularly or observe basic hygiene practices. There are already reports of cholera. With crops having failed due to the absence of rain this year, malnutrition and starvation are spreading. 

By Ali Fathollah-Nejad

The November presidential election victory of Joe Biden against the incumbent Donald Trump raised alarm bells within the anti-Iran front in the Middle East – most notably Israel and Saudi Arabia. They reckon that the days of Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against Iran are numbered, and fear that President-elect Biden will follow through on his campaign promise to return the USA to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or the Iran nuclear deal), which will include easing sanctions on Iran in exchange for the latter’s return to the limits and restraints imposed by the JCPOA on its nuclear programme.

With just over a month left for the Trump administration, there has been a sense of urgency among Iran’s foes not only to sustain but to increase the pressure on Tehran in this period, by creating new facts that the Biden administration would not be able to ignore, and which will complicate any smooth transition to a new US Iran policy. These new facts could be achieved through new sanctions on Iran, or through other means, such as covert operations against Iran’s nuclear programme intended to provoke an Iranian reaction. This last possibility reportedly featured prominently in a November visit to the region by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, especially in his meetings with Israeli, Saudi and UAE leaders. Given these attempts at increasing agitation by the anti-Iran front, as well as Trump’s unpredictability, concerns were raised in Tehran. Iran’s military leadership has, as expected and in its usual manner, reacted with a language of defiance and counter-threats. 

By Ramzy Baroud

In September 2017, organizers of the ‘Africa-Israel Summit’ indefinitely postponed their event which was scheduled to be held in Lomé, Togo, from 23 to 27 October, a month after they made their decision. What Israeli leaders saw as a temporary setback was partly the result of intense, behind-the-scenes lobbying of several African and Arab countries, including South Africa, Algeria, and Morocco.

The conference and its postponement, or, more correctly, cancellation, was, however, hardly the beginning or end of the efforts of Israeli prime minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, to court Africa. In January 2019, Tel Aviv announced it had established diplomatic relations with Chad, and that Mali, also a Muslim majority country, would follow suit soon thereafter.

The Denis Hurley Peace Institute, an NGO that is part of the South African Cathholic Bishops' Conference, regularly compiles reports on Northern Mozambique from its sources in Pemba, Mozambique. We  co-publish, with the DHPI, those reports here.

COUNTRY UPDATE: 8 December 2020

Johan Viljoen

SACBC Solidarity Visit

Denis Hurley Peace Institute (DHPI) facilitated a solidarity visit by the Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference (SACBC) to the Diocese of Pemba, Cabo Delgado,  over the period 2 to 4 December. The SACBC delegation consisted of Bishop Victor Phalana (Bishop of Klerksdorp and SACBC liaison Bishop for Justice and Peace), Bishop Jose Luis Ponce de Leon (Bishop of Manzini), Sr Tshifhiwa Munenzhe (newly appointed SACBC Secretary General) and Johan Viljoen (DHPI Director). The Mozambican delegation consisted of Bishop Luis Fernando Lisboa (Bishop of Pemba) and Archbishop Inacio Saure (Archbishop of Nampula and Vice President of the Mozambican Bishops’ Conference), Mr Manuel Nota (Director of Diocese of Pemba Caritas) and Ms Bettinha Ribeiro (Caritas Pemba Project Manager). The group visited Good Shepherd Mission (Pemba), Paquitiquete (Pemba), as well as refugee settlements in Ancwabe (about 100 km north of Pemba) and Metuge (about 50 km from Pemba). 

The Denis Hurley Peace Institute, an NGO that is part of the South African Cathholic Bishops' Conference, regularly compiles reports on Northern Mozambique from its sources in Pemba, Mozambique. We co-publish, with the DHPI, those reports here.

COUNTRY UPDATE: 19 November  2020

By Mahdi Ghodsi and Ali Fathollah-Nejad

The COVID-19 pandemic has ravaged Iran’s already ailing economy, but the country’s economic crisis is rooted in factors beyond the pandemic’s fallout. Since the United States’ 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA – or Iran Nuclear Deal), it has become clear that Iran’s economic woes – especially its currency devaluation – are strongly correlated with key political and geopolitical events. The volatility in the exchange rate and Iran’s currency depreciation are signs of an unhealthy economy.

By Nikolay Kozhanov

Introduction

The Israeli-Emirati Memorandum of understanding and cooperation on the use of storage capacities and pipeline infrastructure of the Israeli Europe-Asia Pipeline Company (EAPC – previously the Eilat Ashkelon Pipeline Co Ltd) will undoubtedly benefit both Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv. However, the agreement is unlikely to have the strong impact on the oil market that is currently claimed by the signatories.

The agreement on normalisation of relations between the UAE and Israel, signed in September, is becoming the cornerstone of the legal and contractual basis for the development of future Israeli-Emirati relations. During the bilateral business summit held in Abu Dhabi in late October 2020, the two countries signed a number of important documents, including a memorandum on the use and development of the EPAC oil and oil products infrastructure. According to the Israeli and Emirati media, this step should open up access for the UAE to theEuropean oil market. However, such statements are somewhat inconsistent with reality.

By Ramzy Baroud 

In a few words, a close associate of Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu summed up the logic behind the ongoing frenzy to expand illegal Jewish settlements in Israel. ‘These days are an irreplaceable opportunity to establish our hold on the Land of Israel, and I’m sure that our friend, President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu will be able to take advantage,’ Miki Zohar, a member of the Likud Party was quoted as saying.

By ‘these days’, Zohar was referring to the remaining few weeks of Trump’s term in office. The US president was trounced by his Democratic Party rival, Joe Biden, in the presidential elections held on 3 November. Trump’s defeat ignited fears in Tel Aviv, and heated debates in the Israeli Knesset, that the new US administration might challenge Israel’s unhindered settlement expansion policies. Indeed, not only was Israel allowed to expand old settlements and build new ones throughout Trump’s term, but it was actually encouraged by US officials to do so with a great sense of urgency.

By Ali Fathollah-Nejad and Amin Naeni

The outcome of the 3 November US presidential election will reverberate far beyond the USA, especially in Iran, where it may influence the fortunes of rival political factions as well as the results of Iran’s own presidential elections next June.

The Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign has imposed unprecedented economic sanctions against Iran and severely undercut the credibility of the reformist camp. Massive popular disillusionment with so-called moderates made it easier for hardliners to win control over the Iranian parliament in February. Now, due to the reluctance of many Iranians to participate in future elections – out of disappointment at the failure of reformists to fulfil their promises of economic progress and political reform – hardliners are hoping to gain the presidency as well.

The Denis Hurley Peace Institute, an NGO that is part of the South African Cathholic Bishops' Conference, regularly compiles reports on Northern Mozambique from its sources in Pemba, Mozambique. We co-publish, with the DHPI, those reports here.

COUNTRY UPDATE: 27 October  2020

Johan Viljoen

Is an attack on Pemba Imminent?

The arrival of over 7 000 displaced persons on fishing boats during the course of last week in Pemba, fleeing attacks by insurgents in the north of the province, has raised fears of a possible attack on the city of Pemba itself. On Friday 23 October Julião João Cumbane, a senior Frelimo party member and part of the country’s intelligence community, wrote on his Facebook page that there are almost certainly “terrorists” amongst the refugees, who are posing as refugees to infiltrate Pemba, and plan an attack. 

On Saturday 27 October information was received from Metuge, about 10 km from Pemba, that insurgents had sent messengers to the community to warn them to evacuate “if they wanted to save their lives”. The City of Pemba is situated on a peninsula on the southern entrance to Pemba Bay. Metuge is on the mainland. 

The Denis Hurley Peace Institute, an NGO that is part of the South African Catholic Bishops' Conference, regularly compiles reports on Northern Mozambique from its sources in Pemba, Mozambique. We co-publish, with the DHPI, those reports here.

COUNTRY UPDATE: 21 October  2020

Johan Viljoen

An escalation in the fighting in Cabo Delgado has resulted in a renewed influx of refugees to the provincial capital Pemba, by boat. The first fishing boats arrived on Saturday 17 October when hundreds of families disembarked  at Paquiquete beach from boats, each carrying 30 to 40 people, fleeing the armed conflict in the districts of Quissanga and Macomia. Children, women, the elderly and the sick travelled several miles in overcrowded boats. On Sunday around 700 people from the Quirimbas Archipelago, and from communities of Olumboa, Guludo, Ntoni, Kirimizi and Mucojo, in Macomia district, disembarked at the beach, the majority of them women and children.

The Denis Hurley Peace Institute, an NGO that is part of the South African Catholic Bishops' Conference, regularly compiles reports on Northern Mozambique from its sources in Pemba, Mozambique. We co-publish, with the DHPI, those reports here.

COUNTRY UPDATE: 16 October  2020

Johan Viljoen

Insurgents attach village in Tanzania

For the first time, the conflict in Cabo Delgado has spilled across the border into Tanzania, marking a dangerous escalation of the violence. About 30 insurgents  from Mozambique attacked the village of Kitaya on the Ruvuma river (right by the border) on 14 October n the evening (around 7 to 9 pm). There is a Tanzanian army base close to the village and Tanzanian soldiers tried to intervene, but the insurgents were very well equipped with machine guns and other material, and the soldiers could not do much. According to reports, two Tanzanian soldiers and 1 villager were killed, and another villager was shot in the legs.  1 tanker and 2 army vehicles were burned, in addition to the village dispensary, shops, warehouses and several houses. 30 Tanzanian villagers were taken by force to Mozambique by the insurgents. The insurgents claimed that that this was only the beginning, as they want the border between Tanzania and Mozambique to start in Lindi, not Mtwara

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